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A B S T R A C T  
In 2004, a long-awaited piece of post-apartheid legislation, the Communal Land 
Rights Act – to reform the land tenure of those living in the former ‘homelands ’ 
of South Africa – was passed into law unanimously by parliament. This 
unanimity, however, conceals the extent to which the process towards this 
moment was deeply contested. Exploring the eﬀorts by land sector NGOs to 
secure legitimacy in their engagements with this process reveals the extent to 
which wider power relations and contestations have determined their positioning. 
Those within the non-governmental land sector who opposed the legislation 
pitted themselves against African National Congress politicians and high-proﬁle 
traditional leaders. However, the adoption of a Mamdani-inspired discourse to 
contest such politics and oppose the proposed legislation contributed to re-
inscribing narrow readings of knowledge considered to be legitimate. Their en­
gagements were also shaped by changes in the NGO sector. Reduced funding for 
land sector NGOs and an increasingly ambivalent relationship between them and 
government contributed to contestations between NGOs and among people 
working within them. Their strategic engagements in such wider and internal 
politics inﬂuenced both the frames within which such policy change could be 
debated and the ways in which individuals working for NGOs consequently 
positioned themselves in relation to their constituents. 
* I would like to thank Ian Scoones, Barbara Oomen, Linda Waldman, Phil Woodhouse and 
Roy Maconachie for their comments and guidance in relation to earlier versions of this work, as well as 
two anonymous referees for their comments. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the support of 
an ESRC Studentship (Institute of Development Studies, PTA-030-2003-00356) and Fellowship 
(Institute of Development Policy and Management, PTA-026-27-1924). 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
This paper considers the non-governmental land sector (NGLS) in post-
apartheid South Africa, and its engagements with debates over the reform 
of tenure in the former ‘homelands’ of the country after the advent of 
democracy in 1994. Such debates culminated with the passing of a piece of 
legislation, the Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA), in 2004. CLARA 
was passed unanimously by the South African Parliament months before 
the country’s third democratic elections. But the legislation pitted diﬀerent 
groups against each other, including government bureaucrats, African 
National Congress (ANC) politicians, traditional leaders in the former 
‘homelands’, human rights lawyers, rural women, and land sector and 
gender activists. Exploring such engagements reveals the extent to which 
wider power relations and contestations between and amongst NGOs 
have shaped their positioning in engaging with policy change. Many 
accounts have considered how development agencies and NGOs have 
constructed discourses of development that have ‘produced’ particular 
identities and marginalised diﬀerence (Ferguson 1994; Robins 2001), and 
this analysis contributes to such accounts. However, it also considers dif­
ferentiation between land sector NGOs themselves, and between actors 
within them, and how such on-going contestations have contributed to 
constructing particular discourses and shaping practice. This, in turn, has 
produced particular readings of legitimate knowledge and has inﬂuenced 
the accepted identities of those they claim to represent. 
After South Africa’s ﬁrst democratic elections in 1994, dramatic political 
change inﬂuenced the relations between land sector NGOs, amongst 
people working within them, and between them and their constituents. 
The country’s second democratic elections in 1999 also ushered in far-
reaching change. A new Minister for Land and Agriculture was ap­
pointed, who replaced many staﬀ members of the Department for Land 
Aﬀairs (DLA) and shelved its existing plans for tenure reform. For many 
within the NGLS, the period after 1999 became deﬁned by their perceived 
exclusion. Meanwhile, relations between NGOs within the land sector 
suﬀered, with conﬂicts between individuals within the NGLS coming to 
the fore ; discourses of race and gender, liberalism and radicalism became 
linked with struggles over activist capital. In this context, the government’s 
new plans for tenure reform were tabled. While high-proﬁle traditional 
leaders appeared to be privileged in the reforms, the NGLS complained 
of its marginalisation. In response, in attempting to strategically contest 
CLARA at the level of policy, many land sector NGOs adopted a 
Mamdani-inspired anti-chieftaincy discourse which had strong historical 
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resonance within the activist sector (see Mamdani 1996). The adoption of 
this discourse, however, not only delineated NGOs’ engagements with 
policy, but also shaped their speciﬁc engagements with their constituents. 
This paper argues that positioning ‘ tradition’ within a binary discourse 
of ‘undemocratic chiefs ’ versus their ‘democratic other’ excludes more 
nuanced understandings of an everyday, negotiated, often contested, 
reality in which the attainment of ‘democracy’ is unequal. 
While analysis here principally focuses on the engagements of the 
NGLS, it draws on twelve months qualitative ﬁeldwork undertaken in 
2005–6, considering the engagement of diﬀerent groupings in the policy 
process relating to CLARA (Fortin 2008). This included over 135 inter­
views, focusing on key participants in the policy processes of land tenure 
reform over the ten years between 1994 and 2004, as well as on those who 
would be the subjects of the reforms. It also involved archival research and 
textual analysis. Many insights were developed through ethnographic re­
search at diﬀerent individuals’ places of work, including four months 
ﬁeldwork in Limpopo Province, undertaking research in one village in the 
former Gazankulu homeland and with staﬀ at Nkuzi Development 
Association, an NGO working predominantly in that province. 
The ﬁrst section of this paper describes the ‘homelands’, their con­
struction under apartheid and the ambivalent role of chiefs in this project. 
The second section discusses the engagement of high-proﬁle traditional 
leaders with politics, focusing on the period of South Africa’s post-1994 
transition. This locates the politics aroused by reforms adopted after the 
advent of democracy in 1994 to deal with land tenure in the homelands – 
the focus of the following section. These three sections contextualise the 
subsequent analysis of changing relations within the NGLS after 1994 until 
2004, when CLARA was passed into law, and how these shaped the 
NGLS response to CLARA. This analysis, however, is foregrounded with 
a brief discussion of the theoretical frames the paper draws upon and 
contributes to. The ﬁnal two sections of the paper explore the ways in 
which the adoption of that discourse produced ‘ legitimate’ identities and 
marginalised others. 
T H E  H OM E L A N D S  A N D  C H I E F S  
Inequality in South Africa is stark, having its roots in thousands of 
laws passed by the former apartheid regime. Its policy of ‘ separate de­
velopment’ was pursued principally through the creation and minimal 
sustenance of the former ‘homelands’, with their powers of rule and ad­
ministration of land delegated to chiefs with jurisdiction over particular 
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areas (Evans 1997 ; Hendricks 1990). Although the ‘homelands’ make up 
just 13% of the land area of the country, in 2001 it was estimated that 
19,050,159 people lived in ‘ rural areas ’ of the country (Statistics SA 2002).1 
Moreover, in 1997 it was estimated that more than 73% of those living in 
such areas were living in ‘poverty’ (MWPD 1997). 
By 1994 there were ten South African homelands, four of which were 
‘ independent ’. Under apartheid, they were to provide a ‘home’ for the 
people who lived there, as well as all the other people from the same 
‘ tribe’ living elsewhere in South Africa. They also became a ‘dumping 
ground’ for millions of people who were removed from ‘black spots ’ and 
farms in ‘white ’ South Africa (Hendricks 1990; James 2007; Murray 1992). 
Others living on land that was deﬁned as being for a diﬀerent ‘ tribe ’ were 
also forcibly removed across the ‘border ’ (Harries 1989). Given the small 
proportion of the country taken up by the homelands, and the growing 
numbers of people living there, many of these areas became increasingly 
overcrowded (Evans 1997). 
Various statutes institutionalised a system of customary law and granted 
chiefs jurisdiction over particular areas (Bennett 2008; Letsoalo 1987; 
van Kessel & Oomen 1997). For example, the 1951 Bantu Administration 
Act centralised control in the form of ‘ indirect rule ’ (Evans 1997;Mamdani 
1996), reinforcing the power of the chiefs with the creation of ‘Tribal 
Authorities ’. Given the chiefs’ mediation of the systems of apartheid 
control, many of them were extremely unpopular; their ability to gain 
acceptance by people living within their jurisdiction was circumscribed 
by their positions as mediators (Vail 1989). For example, it was the chiefs 
who were charged with overseeing the acquiescence of ‘ their people ’ to 
the immensely unpopular ‘betterment ’ schemes (see e.g. de Wet 1989). 
Resistance to such schemes, which led to many rural revolts, ‘went hand 
in hand with opposition to the establishment of Tribal Authorities ’ 
(Letsoalo 1987: 55). And, as Vail (1989: 18) recognised, ‘ for many involved 
in this struggle, land, and access to land, came to stand at the very 
centre of their consciousness ’. And it was the chiefs who mediated access 
to land. 
The impact of such a reinvigorated form of indirect rule, however, was 
ambivalent. As recognised by Delius (2008: 224), ‘ the image of systematic 
control conveyed by legislation and regulation belied the more complex 
realities on the ground’. While chiefs can be described as ‘ instruments of 
control ’ (ibid. : 231), the extent of power linked to such devolved authority 
cannot be taken for granted. This complicates Mamdani’s (1996) thesis of 
‘decentralised despotism’. Although those people who dissociated from 
tribal authorities were subject to severe discrimination, tribal authorities 
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and chiefs had ‘an incentive to engineer, increase and consolidate their 
following for territorial gain’ (Wotshela 2004: 331). And so, ‘ inﬂuential 
chiefs, government oﬃcials and other notable ﬁgures, of all political 
stripes, positioned themselves as regional brokers, channelling state re­
sources into their localities ’ (Gibbs 2009: 4). 
After 1994, it is unsurprising that many of those who had beneﬁted from 
the power relations under the homeland systems would endeavour to hold 
onto what power they had, until then, managed to access. While chiefs, or 
‘ traditional leaders ’, as they were called in the new constitution, continued 
to be paid as bureaucrats by the post-apartheid government, power rela­
tions on the ground became increasingly contested with the introduction 
of local and provincial government. Such contestations were also played 
out in the bigger politics at a national level, with traditional leaders en­
deavouring, to a large extent successfully, to deﬁne framings of ‘ tradition’ 
and ‘ custom’ to support their continued authority over land in such areas. 
Meanwhile, there was a groundswell of opinion in activist circles against 
traditional leaders who were considered to be inherently undemocratic. 
Land tenure reform, to be taken on by CLARA, was one strand of the 
government’s post-apartheid land reform programme that was to run 
headlong into these related politics. 
T R A D I T I O N A L  L E A D E R S  A N D  T H E  A N C: P O L I T I C A L  M A C H I N A T I O N S  
Since 1948, the apartheid National Party had seen traditional leaders as 
important intermediaries in garnering support (Evans 1997). However, 
the ANC’s relationship with traditional leaders had been patchier, and 
was further complicated by the emergence in 1987 of the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) (Ntsebeza 2005; 
Oomen 2000; van Kessel & Oomen 1997). CONTRALESA was formed 
by a number of ANC-aligned chiefs who had been brought together 
through the activities of ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) 
structures (Maloka 1996). This was ironic, given that just one year before, 
in 1986, the National Working Committee of the UDF had resolved that 
‘ tribal structures should be replaced with democratic organisations ’ (van 
Kessel & Oomen 1997: 5). Nevertheless, the ANC quickly moved to sup­
port CONTRALESA, despite criticism from ‘old guard ANC activists, 
intellectuals and rank and ﬁle members ’ (ibid. : 7). And, with the ANC’s 
chief rival, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), commanding extensive 
authority in the rural KwaZulu homeland, the ANC, with its long-
standing urban bias, tried to use CONTRALESA as its own lever into the 
homelands. 
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Since 1994, traditional leaders’ most prominent spokesmen have ﬁgured 
prominently in politics within both the ANC and IFP, as well as through 
CONTRALESA. Moreover, they have managed to secure their greatest 
coups through closed-door meetings with the president and deputy presi­
dent, through ‘ technical committees ’ and ‘ task teams’, and other means 
(Oomen 2005). ‘Traditionalist ’ and ‘Africanist ’ discourses have been im­
portant in such political struggles for legitimacy. For example, in the 
negotiations over the interim constitution, CONTRALESA spearheaded 
a campaign over the exemption of customary law from gender equality 
provisions, and deployed such discourses to legitimise their position and 
delineate the boundaries and terms of the conﬂict (Walker 1994). 
Although a constitutional compromise was forged between respecting 
tradition and gender equality in these negotiations, other battles continued 
to rage over provisions for local government in the homelands, with tra­
ditional leaders demanding that they ‘continue’ to be the local govern­
ment in their areas of jurisdiction. For example, in response to one 
proposal, CONTRALESA, uniting with the IFP, threatened legal pro­
ceedings against the government, called for a boycott of the local 
government elections, and organised a march to Pretoria against the 
president (Maloka 1996; Ntsebeza 2005). In response to another, there 
were spectacular displays of traditional leaders brandishing traditional 
battle regalia, and ‘ethnic ’ violence breaking out in opposition to the im­
position of new borders in many rural areas (Oomen 2005). Such high-
proﬁle and controversial responses were successful not only in stalling the 
legislation, but also in leveraging the power of traditional leaders as a 
political force. 
This was the context in which legislation to reform tenure in the former 
homelands came to be formulated. The precursor of CLARA, the Land 
Rights Bill (LRB), was ﬁrst tabled in early 1999, adopting an approach to 
tenure reform that was to conﬁrm, through statutory recognition, the 
status of existing de facto rights as property rights and thereby to grant 
people living in those areas legally recognised security of tenure. Although 
the proponents of this ‘ rights-based approach’ to reform understood 
such a model to address a range of tenure-related problems,2 of greatest 
political importance in this model of reform was that it would avoid the 
transfer of ownership or administration of the land to the ‘ chiefs ’, as 
leaders of their communities. While this was in line with land sector acti­
vists’ espousal of ‘democracy’ and ‘women’s rights ’, it was nevertheless 
politically controversial given that it ﬂew in the face of the ‘ traditional ’ 
lobby backing greater powers for the chieftaincy. Given the prominence 
of such issues in the 1999 general election, its timing – just before that 
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election – was unfortunate. The new president, Thabo Mbeki, appointed 
a new Minister for Land and Agriculture, who promptly withdrew the 
LRB. After doing so, she indicated her intentions in relation to communal 
land, coming down squarely in support of traditional leaders (see e.g. 
MALA 2000). 
When in November 2001 the draft replacement bill, the Communal 
Land Rights Bill (CLRB), was ‘ leaked’ at a government-convened tenure 
conference, it was greeted with dismay by a number of activists. It adopted 
a model of reform that would transfer ownership of the land to ‘African 
traditional communities ’, with administration of land to be carried out by 
a ‘Land Administration Committee’ (LAC), including within it traditional 
leaders. For activists, traditional authorities were seen as an apartheid 
creation and inherently undemocratic. Moreover, again pitting ‘gender’ 
against ‘ tradition’, the proposals were seen to ‘entrench … the power of 
traditional leaders over land [which] was likely to reinforce patriarchal 
power relations and harden the terrain within which women struggle to 
access and retain land’ (Claassens & Ngubane 2008). 
Such conﬂict in relation to tenure reform erupted at the same time as 
negotiations over local government reform and the continued roles of 
traditional leaders. These reforms were to be embodied in the White 
Paper on Traditional Leadership issued in July 2003. Following on from 
this, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill was 
agreed in September 2003, coinciding with amendments to the CLRB. 
The provisions of the two Acts were tied together : if traditional authorities 
adopted the good governance requirements embodied in the TLGFB, 
they would administer the land in such areas ; if not, they would not even 
be able to participate in such administration. Such a move was decried by 
many of CLARA’s critics as a ‘ carrot and stick’ to traditional leaders. 
Although the strategic engagements by the NGLS in opposing the 
CLRB are the focus of this article, the context of these is clear : while those 
within the NGLS were lobbying the government to ‘ scrap the CLRB’, 
consultation with and negotiations between high-proﬁle traditional leaders 
and the ANC leadership were simultaneously going on in relation to local 
government reform and the continued roles of traditional leaders (Oomen 
2005: 68). 
T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  T E N U R E  R E F O R M  
‘Oﬃcial ’ customary law can be read as having deﬁned the tenure system 
in the former homelands:3 it dictated how much land people living in such 
rural areas were to be allocated, how they were to live on that land, and 
390 NGOs A ND L AND T ENUR E R E FORM I N S OUTH  A F R I C A  
who was to administer it – namely chiefs (Cousins & Claassens 2004). 
While apartheid policy-makers relied on chiefs for information as to the 
content of customary law, they relied upon ‘ tradition’ to imbue customary 
law with a certain legitimacy (Bennett 2008). In recognising the invention 
of tradition and myth and the construction of nations on forgeries, how­
ever, Evans (1997: 248, quoting Nixon 1993) warns against ignoring ‘ the 
institutional solidity of their eﬀects ’ ; the ‘oﬃcial ’ version of customary 
tenure has had on-going inﬂuence (Oomen 2005). 
Although many laws delegating powers of land administration and ju­
dicial functions continued to remain in place after the end of apartheid 
(ibid.), tenure arrangements within the homelands cannot be read oﬀ the 
statute books. As recognised by Berry (1992: 347), ‘ indirect rule aﬀected 
the management of resources by assigning property rights to social groups 
whose structures were subject to perennial contest ’. Moreover, such 
perennial contest ‘within ever-ﬂuctuating social and political settings ’ 
determines a negotiated ‘ living law’ (Oomen 2005: 203). That is, power 
relations are contested within rural societies, and cut through by gender, 
age, ethnicity, and wealth in all its diﬀerent guises. Ultimately, it is this 
mishmash of legal arrangements and practice that stands to be reformed in 
such land reform legislation. 
In order to position the responses of the NGLS to tenure reform policy, 
it is important to contextualise them amongst other louder voices within 
South Africa advocating particular forms of tenure reform and criticising 
the approach embodied in CLARA (e.g. Cousins & Claassens 2004). 
While such voices have been relatively unsuccessful in achieving political 
inﬂuence over the tenure policies that were eventually incorporated 
into law, their inﬂuence within the NGLS cannot be underestimated. 
Particularly prominent have been Cousins, the director of the Programme 
for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western 
Cape, a small centre of activist researchers, and Claassens, an independent 
consultant. Both have been active in South African land issues for over 
thirty years. In leading opposition to CLARA, they secured R1million 
(£75,500) of funding from the UK Department for International Devel­
opment (DfID) in July 2002 for a ‘ community consultation, advocacy and 
lobbying project ’ that also included a media strategy (the PLAAS/NLC 
project). This involved NGOs and their rural constituents from around the 
country participating in a series of workshops on the proposed CLRB, 
culminating in making submissions to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee 
on Land and Agriculture. 
Prior to 1999, Cousins and Claassens had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence over 
the model adopted in the Land Rights Bill (LRB) – Cousins in his capacity 
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as external consultant on government’s Tenure Reform Core Group 
(TRCG) which was in existence from 1995 to 1998 and which worked on 
creating that model, and Claassens in her role as advisor to the minister 
over the same period and also as a member of the TRCG and then LRB 
drafting team. Both of them, together and separately, have been proliﬁc in 
terms of their academic and policy publications setting out their extensive 
criticisms of CLARA (Claassens & Cousins 2008; Cousins 2005a, 2005b, 
2007; Cousins & Claassens 2004, 2006). 
Cousins and Claassens’ analysis of the character of tenure in South 
Africa, its variety of forms and the implications of this for achieving se­
curity of tenure, particularly amongst vulnerable groups, has been exten­
sive. Nevertheless, in their attempts to inﬂuence the political machinations 
between traditional leaders and the ANC in the ﬁnal few months before 
CLARA was passed into law, other aspects of their analysis of the com­
plexities and varieties of South Africa’s land tenure were somewhat 
eclipsed. 
For Cousins and Claassens, the principal political problem with CLARA 
is that it would ‘ replicate … a problematic version of ‘‘custom’’ ’ (Cousins 
2007: 308) ; the ‘ social embeddedness ’ of property should be recognised 
and secured through law only so far as doing so would not have this result. 
Instead, the answer is ‘ to vest land rights in individuals rather than in 
groups or institutions ’ (ibid.). Vesting land rights in groups or institutions 
was deemed a particularly unsatisfactory solution because it would bring 
to the fore the political decision: to whom or what should the rights be 
transferred? Given the growing political prominence of certain traditional 
leaders and their inﬂuence over the ANC at this time, it was likely that 
any response to this question would privilege them. Indeed, as indicated 
above, the response to this question embodied in CLARA was that 
the land should be transferred to ‘African traditional communities ’ with 
administration of land to be carried out by a ‘Land Administration 
Committee’, including within it traditional leaders. For Cousins and 
Claassens, such a response was politically unacceptable. Traditional 
authorities, seen as an apartheid creation, were considered to be inherently 
undemocratic. Moreover, as argued by Claassens, most recently with 
Ngubane, CLARA would: ‘entrench … the power of traditional leaders 
over land [which] was likely to reinforce patriarchal power relations 
and harden the terrain within which women struggle to access and 
retain land … [and] would entrench past discrimination against women 
by upgrading and formalising … rights held exclusively by men’ 
(Claassens & Ngubane 2008). The alternative solution, ‘ to vest land rights 
in individuals … and to make socially legitimate existing occupation and 
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use, or de facto ‘‘ rights ’’ ’, Cousins (2007: 308) proposed, would be 
achieved through ‘ legal recognition’. This was what was proposed in 
the LRB. 
In criticising CLARA, Cousins appears to see such ‘problematic ver­
sions ’ of tenure as contained within the legislation, rather than counte­
nancing the possibility that they may actually already exist in practice, 
shaping and deﬁning such de facto rights. However, the power of legis­
lation to change socially embedded practice is uncertain; at best, legislat­
ive reforms are likely to be one factor amongst many that inﬂuence 
practice (Oomen 2005). In any case, legislative reforms that do not take 
into account the extent to which practice shapes social relations are likely 
simply to fail in achieving their desired goals. 
While Cousins and Claassens were relatively unsuccessful in challeng­
ing the government in terms of the model of reform adopted in CLARA, 
they were inﬂuential within the NGLS. CLARA came to be debated at a 
time when the NGLS was weakened through its worsening relationship 
with government and on-going inﬁghting centring on the National Land 
Committee (NLC), an umbrella organisation bringing together aﬃliated 
NGOs from around the country (see below). And so, it was the academic 
institution, PLAAS – or rather its director, Cousins, and consultant, 
Claassens – not the NLC, that put together a proposal for the PLAAS/ 
NLC project. And Cousins and Claassens went on to drive this national 
project. 
These sections set the stage for discussing the contestations within the 
NGLS in relation to the CLRB. First, however, I will outline the theor­
etical frames through which those contestations in their engagement with 
these policy processes will be analysed. 
P O S I T I O N I N G  NGOs I N  THE  ACT I V I S T  F I E L D  
Broad generalisations have been made not just about ‘civil society ’, but 
also about the place of NGOs within it. However, as recognised by 
Ferguson (1994: 13) in respect of development agencies, there is an on­
going need to interrogate how control is exercised, how a structure is re­
produced: that is, to consider the processes and struggles within the ‘black 
box’. Rather than making assumptions about the role of NGOs and their 
eﬀect, this article contributes to a growing literature responding to this call 
(Fernando 2003; Mosse 2005; Nauta 2004). In order to better understand 
the struggles within and amongst South Africa’s NGLS after the advent of 
democracy and how these aﬀected engagements with the policy process 
relating to tenure reform, I draw upon Bourdieu in conceptualising an 
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‘activist ﬁeld’ within which NGOs and activists are positioned. ‘Activist ’ 
implies a particular role for such supposedly, perhaps idealistically, non-
state, non-market actors, and ‘ﬁeld’ emphasises the extent to which this 
is constantly negotiated and contested by those operating within it. Its 
boundaries are also negotiated, being delineated by forms of immaterial 
and material resources or relations, or ‘ capital ’, considered to be valuable 
within it (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). 
Many of the struggles within the activist ﬁeld are over attempts by 
NGOs to secure ‘ legitimacy’ (Edwards & Hulme 1996). Rather than being 
‘ something which an NGO can objectively have’, Hudson (2001: 332) 
has pointed out that such ‘ ‘‘ legitimacy’’ is seen as a quality that may be 
ascribed to an NGO by actors coming from diﬀerent viewpoints ’. As 
recognised by Bourdieu (1990), in any ﬁeld there will be contestations 
between individuals struggling for access to capital so as to secure their 
position within its hierarchy, ultimately for ‘ symbolic capital ’, or legit­
imacy. Within the activist ﬁeld in South Africa, the extent to which 
individuals may be able to claim symbolic capital often depends on their 
activist or ‘ struggle ’ credentials – that is, the extent to which they were 
legitimately seen to be active opponents of apartheid. It might in turn 
depend upon their habitus, or ‘embodied history’ (ibid. : 56). But NGOs are 
in a diﬃcult position, given that they act across and engage with others 
within a number of diﬀerent ﬁelds at the same time. They may be strug­
gling to gain legitimacy from others positioned within another ﬁeld, such 
as for example the political ﬁeld, in their engagements with policy pro­
cesses. Such interactions will contribute to what Bourdieu calls a ‘ﬁeld of 
power’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 114). And the relations within this 
wider ﬁeld of power will determine the extent of symbolic capital wielded 
by diﬀerent individuals at any particular time. Given that forms of activist 
capital, however, may not be recognised by those positioned within this 
wider ﬁeld, activists will have to adopt particular strategies of engagement 
in such relations. 
In acting across diﬀerent ﬁelds, activist land sector NGOs can be seen to 
be acting as bridges. They relate both to rural people, most of whom are 
marginalised in terms of their material reality and access to information 
but subject to immense inequalities of power and on-going contestation, 
and also to those in the government and in wider policy-making spheres. 
This mediating position gives them access to knowledge conceived within 
these two very diﬀerent ﬁelds, and they often claim to use it in order to 
improve the lives of those who are marginalised. However, this is where 
the contradictions and source of so much conﬂict within the ﬁeld lie. How 
can they strategise in positioning themselves in relation to the wider ﬁeld 
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of power, at the same time as representing honestly the voices of their 
marginalised constituents? 
So, while NGOs are uniquely positioned to fulﬁl this potential – ‘ to add 
real insight to local grassroots and political strategies ’ (Mitlin et al. 2007: 
1714, my italics) – whether or not they do so will depend on the strategies 
they adopt, the relationships they choose to build, and the extent to which 
they manage to ‘help … people see things diﬀerently ’ (ibid.). Their en­
gagement with people ‘on the ground’ is essential to their role : both in 
shaping the knowledge that informs the organisation’s positioning in 
policy debates, and also in legitimising their claimed position as mediating 
between the ‘ local ’ and the ‘national ’ and inﬂuencing those debates. As 
recognised by Edwards and Hulme (1992), however, ‘ the degree to which 
a strategy or mix of strategies compromises the logic by which legitimacy is 
claimed provides a useful test of whether organizational self-interest is [a] 
subordinating mission’ (quoted in Edwards 2008: 39). 
C H A N G I N G  R E L A T I O N S  W I T H I N  T H E  N O N-G O V E R N M E N T A L  
L A N D  S E C T O R  
Before the country’s ﬁrst democratic elections, the NGLS predominantly 
comprised land sector NGOs aﬃliated to the umbrella ‘National Land 
Committee’ (NLC) and supported by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), 
a public interest law ﬁrm prominent in the anti-apartheid struggle. For a 
long time, such organisations around the country had worked closely 
together in ﬁghting forced removals from ‘black spots ’ into the former 
‘homelands’ (Abel 1995; James 2007; Nauta 2004). A number of dissident 
academics were also involved as researchers for the Surplus People’s 
Project (SPP), documenting forced removals around the country. NGOs 
that were set up during this time, with funding secured from overseas, 
formed relationships with particular ‘ communities ’ that had contested 
their forced removal. They were often run by left-leaning white middle-
class activists ( James 2007), and aligned themselves with the ideals of 
non-racialism and unity propounded by the opposition ANC-aligned 
UDF. 
After the South African elections in 1994, the inclusion of the NGLS 
in the transition was taken for granted; democratisation was seen to be 
incomplete without ‘ civil society ’ – that is, those associations that partici­
pated in ‘ the struggle ’ – being involved in decision-making (Friedman 
& Reitzes 1996). However, this early transition period was marked by 
ambiguity for former non-governmental activists. In NGOs across the 
country, up to 60% had left by 1997 (Habib & Taylor 1999: 79). For those 
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who remained, although former colleagues were now policy-makers, 
NGOs were left weak and understaﬀed. All these changes contributed to a 
‘deep identity crisis ’ (Heinrich 2001: 4) : ‘ the ultimate goal of the anti­
apartheid and liberal NGOs – that is democracy – had been achieved’, 
replaced by disparate objectives (ibid. : 4, 5). 
Although this ‘new realism era’ (Nauta 2004: 187) had forced a re­
assessment of the relationship between the state and civil society for the 
NGLS, the second democratic elections in 1999 re-emphasised this. For 
many within the activist ﬁeld, the period after 1999 was deﬁned by their 
perceived exclusion. Changes in the DLA after 1999 also aﬀected relations 
between NGOs, amongst people working within them, and between 
them and their constituents. Concern as to the extent to which NGOs 
were truly representative of their grass-roots constituents raised many 
others relating to their role and positioning. While the NLC had for a 
long time discussed the need to support a rural social movement, the 
‘ launch’ of such a movement, the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), 
only happened in 2000 at the World Conference against Racism. The 
tensions that this created within the NLC, however, led to its eventual 
collapse. 
As recognised by James (2007), the LPM was opposed to the ANC, 
adopting slogans such as ‘No land, no vote’. Although many directors of 
the NLC’s aﬃliates did not support the organisation having such a close 
relationship with government up to 1999, for some seeing their NGO 
supporting the emergence of such a social movement went beyond their 
radical positioning. Moreover, while land sector NGOs were under in­
creasing pressure from the diﬃcult funding environment, ‘ suspicions be­
gan to emerge about the way … [the LPM] had been founded, the origin 
of its resources and its style of organisation’ (ibid. : 218). Furthermore, it 
appeared that a small number of individuals working as staﬀ within the 
NLC head oﬃce were assuming increasingly prominent positions within 
the LPM. For those individuals, however, the change in government in 
1999 had brought to the fore exciting dialogues about their own positions 
in inspiring radical change, and trips were organised to Zimbabwe and to 
foster relations with other, more successful, land reform movements 
(Mngxitama 2006). 
In this climate of penny-pinching for all NGOs in South Africa, the 
frustrations of both camps within the NLC were inﬂamed by ﬁnancial 
concerns. Ideological accusations were ﬁred in both directions and par­
ticular framings came to deﬁne the terms of the debate. The LPM became 
the target or, depending on one’s position, the quarry or prize of the 
opposing camps.4 With such changes playing out in the hierarchy of the 
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activist ﬁeld, this period was characterised by conﬂict between individuals 
within it struggling to maintain their position and inﬂuence. 
A  C H A N G I N G  C O N T E X T  O F  O P P O S I T I O N  : R E S P O N S E S  T O 

T E N U R E  R E F O R M 

Tenure reform in the homelands clearly touched on many issues about 
which anti-apartheid activists cared passionately. As indicated above, in 
the late 1980s there was a groundswell of opinion within the UDF, and 
similarly aligned land sector activist circles, against any perpetuation of the 
support of chiefs by the government. As recognised by van Kessel and 
Oomen (1997: 3), ‘grievances against the authoritarian rule and frequent 
misappropriation by the chief ’ were similarly widespread amongst 
inhabitants of rural areas (Ntsebeza 2005). Nevertheless, while youth 
movements campaigned in such areas against the institution of the chief­
taincy, ‘with few exceptions, [they] did not succeed in building a broad 
alliance around [such] campaigns ’ (van Kessel & Oomen, 1997: 3; see also 
Delius 2008: 231). But for UDF activists such leaders were seen to have 
been appointed by the apartheid governments, and as an extended arm of 
an illegitimate state (Lahiﬀ 2003). 
Very few individuals within government, or those who stayed within the 
NGLS after 1994, were themselves from the former ‘homelands’. 
Generally amongst those who came from such an NGO background in 
the early 1990s, knowledge of the ‘homelands’ and the nature of the ‘ in­
security ’ of tenure within such areas was gained from their experience of 
those communities who had been unsuccessful in opposing forced removal 
into them. Understanding tenure in the former ‘homelands’ for those 
whose habitus was not shaped by growing up in such a context was not 
easy. The politics relating to the stark inequalities in land holding and the 
restoration of stolen land rights as a result of the forced removals, dealt 
with in the redistribution and restitution programmes respectively, was 
easier to grasp politically. Nevertheless, tenure reform had been incor­
porated into the constitution (Constitution 1996, s. 25(6)) and, as a result, 
the government was constitutionally mandated to adopt legislation that 
would provide ‘ tenure which is legally secure or … comparable redress ’. 
The NGLS, in turn, had to respond to whatever it came up with. 
After 1994, those at the forefront of policy-making within the DLA 
included a number of white activists who had been actively involved in the 
former SPP, the LRC and the ANC. They embraced a human rights-
oriented agenda in embarking upon an ambitious programme of land 
reform that was to include three aspects. First, redistribution was to redress 
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the appalling racial inequality in land ownership that was apartheid’s 
legacy. Second, the restitution programme was to involve passing legis­
lation to provide people or communities who had been dispossessed of 
their property as a result of past racially discriminatory laws and practices 
after 1913 with restitution of their property or redress. Third, the land 
tenure reform programme also required the DLA to pass legislation to 
provide people whose tenure of land was legally insecure as a result of 
similarly discriminatory laws or practices with legally secure tenure or 
redress. Legislation to reform land tenure throughout the former home­
lands was not passed into law until CLARA was adopted in 2004. 
However tenure insecurity might generally be deﬁned, this third pro­
gramme of tenure reform was to cover only ‘ legal insecurity ’, that is, 
land on which people lived but which they could not be said to legally 
own. 
As discussed above, a ‘ rights-based approach’ to tenure reform in the 
homelands was initially formulated in the late 1990s, embodied in the 
LRB. After the LRB had been shelved, the government’s revised plans for 
tenure reform were not made public until the 2001 government-convened 
Tenure Conference. This conference was a turning point for a number of 
reasons. For the NGO network, however, the ‘ turning point ’ did not 
relate to tenure at all. It was here that ‘ the ﬁssures started to grow more 
obvious ’ (interview, former NLC employee, 19.12.2005) ; the conﬂicts be­
tween diﬀerent individuals and factions within the activist ﬁeld became 
more pronounced. 
C I T I Z E N S  A N D  S U B J E C T S: A  D I S C O U R S E  O F  O P P O S I T I O N  
Struggles within the activist ﬁeld in the post-1999 period to a certain extent 
displaced the issues of tenure reform from the agenda. Nevertheless, many 
land sector NGOs did get involved with the PLAAS/NLC project and 
ended up rallying in opposition to CLARA. About the time of the CLRB 
going through its parliamentary hearings, the media widely reported 
on civil society organisations strategically combining to form a ‘coalition’ 
to speak out with one voice in opposition to the CLRB, conjuring up 
a picture of the coalition’s outrage at the betrayal of democracy by 
government as a result of the bill’s transfer of unprecedented power to 
traditional leaders to the detriment of women. But this picture of a 
coherent coalition all speaking with one voice conceals a much more 
heterogeneous grouping. To a certain extent, this misleading picture was 
the result of a strategic compromise by those within the activist ﬁeld to 
come together in their opposition to the bill. But that such diversity could 
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be interpreted as speaking on the issues with ‘one voice ’ also resulted from 
the discourse that framed the coalition’s opposition to the bill. 
Nkuzi Development Association was one of the NGOs that joined 
the ‘ coalition’ opposing CLARA. It made a submission to Parliament’s 
Portfolio Committee and called for the bill’s rejection. Nkuzi’s (2003) 
submission begins by setting out its central thesis : 
Mamdani shows in his book Citizen and Subject that the traditional authority 
structures as they are now in South Africa, and many other parts of Africa, are a 
construct of the colonial regimes speciﬁcally established to solve the ‘native 
problem’ through indirect rule and what Mamdani describes as ‘decentralised 
despotism’ … An essential characteristic of the decentralised despotism is the 
‘ clenched ﬁst ’ of the chief who combines legislative, judicial, administrative and 
policing powers in one institution and even in one person. 
Building democracy in South Africa requires the dismantling of the bifurcated 
state, overcoming the tribalisation of rural citizens, and ending the subjugation of 
rural people to the ‘clenched ﬁst ’ rule of chiefs and farm owners. Rural people 
need to be allowed to participate as full citizens in the modern democratic state 
with the separation of the legislative, judicial and executive powers, just as the 
Constitution requires. A key test of any new tenure legislation must be the extent 
to which it contributes to this process. 
The tone of the submission is uncompromising in its view of the 
chieftaincy. From this starting point, traditional leaders are per se 
undemocratic – only elected leaders are democratic – and so any recog­
nition of their current role in land administration is unacceptable. The 
unassailability of the constitution is brought in here to support the legit­
imacy of these views. This approach renders the issues black and white 
(using the words critically), the undemocratic chiefs in the former home­
lands and the democratic elected leaders in the rest of the country.5 But in 
doing so, it pushes out questions of nuance about the status of ‘ subjects ’. 
As Oomen (2005: 39) argues : 
What Mamdani’s dualistic analysis fails to recognise is the wide variety of local 
power conﬁgurations, structures of rule and degrees of democratisation that oc­
curred as a result of segregationist policies … While traditional leaders were given 
large powers on paper, these, in practice, had to be exercised within the conﬁnes 
drawn by the bureaucracy. This created diﬀerences in the degree of popular 
political participation in traditional authority areas, and thus in the degree to 
which people were citizens or subjects. 
So when it comes to reform, it is a question of ‘away with the old’ and 
‘ in with the new’, anything less being unacceptable. However, this also 
pushes out questions of nuance about the nature and extent of the form of 
democracy that is to be created in its place. 
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Questions can be asked of such systems both in the former homelands 
and in the accepted institutions of the state operating in the rest of the 
country. Bourdieu (1990: 68) saw doxa as being ‘ the relationship of im­
mediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and a 
ﬁeld to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world 
that ﬂows from practical sense’. Combining ‘ legislative, judicial, admin­
istrative and policing powers in one institution and even in one person’ is 
counterposed with the ‘ separation of powers ’, the pillar of a democratic 
state, here accepted as common sense or doxa. But such clear-cut political 
models also limit the questions which can be asked that might challenge the 
extent of democracy which the current formal and legalised political and 
even democratically legitimised land system achieves. There are, more­
over, other rarely challenged aspects of the ‘democratic state ’ relating to 
property ownership, such as racially deﬁned and gendered inequality 
institutionalised through property and upheld in the ‘ rule of law’ that 
CLARA, in meeting the constitutional imperative of dealing discretely 
with ‘ tenure reform’, would not address. To be fair to Nkuzi’s submission, 
it does call for ‘a national debate ’ that ‘ should not be limited to dealing 
with communal areas, but deal with land tenure for the country as a 
whole’. Nevertheless, as seen in many media reports at the time, the un­
democratic chieftaincy model, while being apparently radical and pro­
gressive, is discursively powerful in limiting or concealing such questions. 
NGOs S T R A T EG I C  P O S I T I O N I NG  I N  R E L A T I O N  TO  C L AR A  
Although many land sector NGOs opposed CLARA, the adoption of the 
anti-chieftaincy model by the ‘ coalition’ marked the end of a progression 
away from the nuance with which diﬀerent groups within the coalition 
approached the issues earlier in the debates. As time progressed towards 
the CLRB’s passage through parliament, and the threat of losing the 
struggle with government grew, those participating in the coalition ap­
proached their opposition to the bill with increasing urgency and passion. 
In turn, the debates became framed in increasingly dichotomous terms 
and people became less able to choose their own positioning. Some groups 
did not subscribe to the model at all but, because it had come to frame the 
issues relating to the reforms, their opposition to the legislation, even if for 
other more nuanced reasons, was interpreted by others as automatically 
assuming the anti-chieftaincy model. 
The adoption of the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ model to frame the debate was 
not unopposed; but such opposition fell to be contested within that other 
maelstrom of activist politics that deﬁned the terms according to which 
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opposition would be read. After the changes in government in 1999, the 
extent to which diﬀerent individuals and NGOs could position themselves, 
or found themselves to be positioned by others, was not only called into 
question in relation to CLARA. In the context of conﬂicts within the NLC 
at the time, the extent to which individuals, maybe even NGOs, within the 
activist ﬁeld could claim ‘activist capital ’ had come to depend increasingly 
on how ‘ radical ’ or ‘ liberal ’ they claimed to be or were accused of being, 
linked variously to how they managed to position themselves in terms of 
class, politics, race or gender. 
Claims or accusations of ‘ radicalism’ came to be interpreted within a 
particular framing which in turn drew in other discourses. Accordingly, 
‘ radicalism’ became interpreted according to a narrative of ‘black= 
radical ’, but this framing included assertions that radicalism was also 
constituted by ‘ in support of social movements ’ (and by extension the 
LPM), ‘anti-NGOs’, and ‘anti-government ’. This framing of ‘ radicalism’ 
in turn involved the counterparts to such discourses so as to constitute its 
antithesis, that is, ‘white=liberal ’ and so ‘ in opposition to social move­
ments ’, ‘pro-NGOs’, and ‘pro-government ’. Therefore, being accused of 
subscribing to any one of these categories automatically draws in the other 
concomitant parts of the frame. So, the accusation ‘all of these guys were 
experts, and these are white guys in the NLC network – as soon as you 
have an LPM that speaks for itself, their kind of prestige becomes ques­
tionable ’ (interview, former NLC employee, 13.1.2006) immediately ex­
plains that the ‘white guys ’ have good reason to oppose the LPM. While, 
of course, there were not only ‘white’ people in the NLC network, or even 
on its board – splits became particularly prominent between NLC board 
members and employees – such factual niceties could only be deployed in 
attempts to undermine the integrality of the frames themselves. For ex­
ample, the accusation that ‘ the oﬃce staﬀ … were self-serving in that they 
wanted to continue getting their overgenerous salaries ’ (interview, former 
NLC board member, 12.1.2006) puts the oﬃce staﬀ into the ‘ liberal ’ camp 
and thereby undermines their own ‘ radical ’ positioning. In turn, the 
accusation that ‘ those leading the charge towards the rurally-poor-led­
social-movements were extreme vanguardists – who were really driving it 
forward as individuals ’ (interview, former NLC employee, 7.12.05) un­
dermines the unassailability of the position of those supporting social 
movements, by casting doubt on their relationship to, and therefore the 
integrity of, the ‘ social movement’ in question. 
While race became linked with struggles over activist capital, gender 
became somewhat displaced. In the ﬁrst ﬁve years of government, with the 
pro-poor stance and gender awareness of activists, poor women had 
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become their representatives of choice. But with the government’s substi­
tution of race and historical disadvantage for poverty, need or gender 
(Walker 2005), for those wanting to inﬂuence policy, ensuring that the 
voices of ‘ the poor’ and ‘women’ were heard by government appeared 
to be increasingly necessary. After the leader of the Rural Women’s 
Movement moved into parliament in 1994, however, the movement 
became increasingly weak, and although ‘gender ’ was incorporated into 
the land sector’s interventions, this may have been as an uninterrogated 
‘add-on’ (ibid.). And certainly, until the PLAAS/NLC project in relation 
to the CLRB in 2003, the practices engendered by the land reform 
programme had not been subject to real scrutiny in terms of their impact 
on gender equality (Hargreaves & Meer 2000). Moreover, with the dis­
courses of the African Renaissance linked with liberation, race became 
‘ superior’ as a criterion of those to be empowered, and for those who 
considered themselves to be more ‘ radical ’, a focus on ‘women’ did not go 
unchallenged. 
These contestations aﬀected diﬀerent NGOs’ engagements with policy 
reform in diﬀerent ways. AFRA, based in KwaZulu-Natal, had been 
undertaking a tenure project since 1998, focusing on Ekuthuleni, a village 
outside the Ingonyama Trust land.5 Even though AFRA participated 
in the coalition (‘ in the end, we did all agree on ‘‘How do we go to 
Parliament to stop this Bill going through?’’ ’ (interview, AFRA director, 
28.2.2006), the organisation did not actively adopt the undemocratic 
chieftaincy model : 
The fundamental one [problem] was … of the Traditional Authorities. The issue 
of whether they are democratic or not, for us, is not the issue. The issues are about 
what gives people secure tenure and one of the things that does that is a well-
functioning tenure committee which is made up of a body of people who are 
constant, and the rules are clear so that they can administer it. If you’re going to 
re-elect them every few years you can’t expect that they will administer it well. If 
you compare it to something like the Deeds oﬃce, why would you want to re-elect 
them. 
(ibid.) 
In the height of the passion in the build-up to the Portfolio Committee 
hearings, holding to such a position was not easy; former allies fell out over 
it and those wanting to challenge the assumptions about traditional leaders 
were branded as ‘conservative ’. With activists, many of whom were white, 
some of whom were at the forefront in planning the ‘coalition’s ’ full 
frontal attack, not accepting positions outside the model, sensitivities and 
anger were inﬂamed. When it came to the Parliamentary hearings, AFRA 
did not in the end present its submission – a move that was explained 
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away by various rumours amongst those in other NGOs that in any case 
shed bad light on ‘ the decision’. 
On-going contestations between and amongst NGOs have shaped their 
practices that in turn have produced particular readings of legitimate 
knowledge and shaped accepted identities of those they claim to represent. 
The word ‘claim’ is not used to undermine the perspectives of actors 
within NGOs, but to draw attention to the way that such representation 
is in itself a strategic action. Here, attention is drawn to the diﬃculties 
encountered in an attempt to represent issues that individuals at AFRA 
believed were most important to their constituents ; doing so would have 
positioned them in a particular way. But not doing so similarly positioned 
them negatively, precisely because the issues they wished to represent 
posited knowledge that was not considered to be legitimate, and identities 
that were not acceptable within the terms of the debates. 
F R O M  M E D I A T I N G  P O L I T I C S  T O  T H E  P O L I T I C S  O F  M E D I A T I O N  
Many individuals working for NGOs, for example those dealing with 
policy, work to position the NGO, and perhaps themselves, strategically in 
relation to the wider ﬁeld of power. However, there are also many others, 
for example ﬁeldworkers, whose everyday work is relatively unconnected 
with (albeit not unaﬀected by) that wider ﬁeld of power: they are more 
involved with the politics of mediating the day-to-day conﬂicts and dis­
putes that arise in their everyday work as ﬁeldworkers. Although, through 
their employment, they may be positioned squarely within the activist 
ﬁeld, their day-to-day relations with their constituents have more to do 
with the relations of power that structure the ‘ rural ﬁeld’. 
In engaging with politics, NGOs have to act strategically. Nevertheless, 
the deployment of particular discourses by NGOs in relation to their 
strategic positioning in policy debates may also inﬂuence the non-strategic 
practices of those within them. This section discusses how the unthinking 
deployment of the Mamdani-inspired discourse in the day-to-day work of 
mediation engaged in by NGO ﬁeldworkers can reinscribe narrow read­
ings of knowledge considered to be legitimate and accepted identities. In 
doing so, it draws upon a number of examples from ﬁeldwork undertaken 
in Limpopo Province with Nkuzi Development Association. 
Nkuzi was set up in 1998 and grew from just three people to having over 
twenty-ﬁve employees in 2005 operating out of four oﬃces, including one 
in Pretoria dealing with ‘policy ’. While the NGO had no tenure project as 
such, many of its staﬀ were from nearby ‘ rural areas ’ and therefore had an 
on-going experiential knowledge of tenure in those areas. But in their 
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capacity as Nkuzi staﬀ, their contact with people living in those villages 
arose largely from their relations with groups which had lodged land res­
titution claims and with people seeking legal advice from Nkuzi’s in-house 
lawyer. 
One staﬀ member of Nkuzi, ‘A’, had been involved with the organis­
ation since the start, and proudly regaled me with tales of early sit-ins at 
the minister’s oﬃce, protests against evictions, and stories of being ‘ tailed 
by the NIA [National Intelligence Agency] ’. In addition to asserting such 
post-apartheid activist struggle credentials, he was also well-versed in the 
discourse of democracy and the law. He was undergoing advocacy train­
ing and dreamed of opening up his own law practice in one of the villages 
nearby where he lived. So that they would be easily translatable to the 
media, even to those working in the policy unit in Pretoria, A was used to 
ﬁtting details of his everyday encounters within the wider discourses and 
politics shaping high-proﬁle issues and cases that Nkuzi was engaged with, 
often acting as a spokesperson for Nkuzi in contacting and relaying local 
stories to the national media. 
When I arrived at Nkuzi and told him what I was interested in, he made 
sure to tell me about the ‘Communal Land Rights Act cases ’ that he was 
dealing with. Knowing that CLARA had not yet been implemented, I was 
unsure as to what these might be and accompanied him to a meeting to 
resolve a ‘Communal Land Rights Act case’. The meeting was with 
the traditional leader and headman of Bungeni, a village at the edge of 
the former Gazankulu ‘homeland’, and a woman from the village. The 
headman had decided to allocate a stand for a garage between the 
woman’s shop and the road, thereby blocking access for any potential 
customers to her shop. The meeting itself was resolved in her favour due to 
A’s knowledge of a bye-law that, in any case, forbade building at the 
proposed proximity to the road. But this was a ‘Communal Land Rights 
Act case’ – showing that the Communal Land Rights Act would be 
‘a terrible thing if left to the chief ’ (personal communication, Nkuzi 
employee, 2.11.2005). 
Although the adoption of such wider discourses may shape the ways in 
which individuals working within an NGO may approach the mediation 
of tenure problems, they will not necessarily displace the knowledge held 
by such people. Indeed, when we were talking about CLARA itself an­
other time, A seemed to support the idea of some sort of committee 
comprising chiefs and elected community members, so long as there were 
clear rules devolving more power to the community and setting out clearly 
the obligations and rules that should govern them (interview, Nkuzi em­
ployee, 28.0.2005) ; ironically, both a ‘LAC’ and ‘Community Rules ’ were 
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provisions of CLARA. But granting recognition only to those tenure 
problems arising from the actions of corrupt or wayward chiefs could 
limit the extent to which the complexity of tenure problems is brought 
to light. 
Such complexity can be illustrated by a reference to another case. 
The PLAAS/NLC project carried out its ﬁrst workshop in Mashamba, a 
village in the former Venda ‘homeland’. But the neighbouring village of 
Chavani in the former Gazankulu, on the other side of the only paved 
road in the area which had formerly been the boundary between Venda 
and Gazankulu, was well known to Nkuzi because of its involvement in a 
number of restitution claims there. When I asked A about Mashamba, 
he claimed not to know much about it – it was not one of Nkuzi’s 
‘ communities ’. However, according to the PLAAS Research Report, 
‘Community views on the Communal Land Rights Bill ’ (Claassens 2003: 
28), there were speciﬁc reasons for choosing Mashamba as a location for 
the ﬁrst workshop: 
Mashamba village was chosen for the consultation site because of a serious tenure 
problem – a headman had entered into a contract with an investor in terms of 
which a large area of communal land had been fenced oﬀ as a potential game 
farm. This has restricted the community’s rights to grazing, hunting and water 
on the land … However, apparently neither the chief not the community were 
adequately consulted about the contract, nor has any beneﬁt emerged in the form 
of rent or jobs. 
During my time in the area, this story had become a bit of a legend; 
many people were aware of it, but its key protagonists and story changed 
depending on the teller – the person selling the land was not a headman 
but a rich businessman living in Mashamba, or the person was indeed a 
headman but the sale had not been completed. The tenure problems in 
the area were complex, as were the changing dynamics of the chieftaincy. 
Apparently, however, it was not this problem that produced the ‘ teething 
problems’ experienced in the workshop (ibid.). The people invited to the 
Mashamba workshop included people under both Mashamba Tribal 
Authority6 and Chavani Traditional Authority, but Nkuzi had only before 
had contact with Chavani, through supporting its restitution claims. One 
of those claims involved a group of people living in Chavani, under Hosi 
(Chief ) X, who were claiming land falling within the area governed by 
Mashamba TA. Some six or seven years since submitting the claim, ac­
cording to the claimants, the government had hardly embarked on dealing 
with the case and tensions between the two groups had heightened over 
this time. Since claiming the land, the PLAAS/NLC project workshop 
meeting was the ﬁrst involvement of all interested parties, and there was 
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confusion amongst those present as to what the meeting was for. I spoke in 
depth to three people who had attended the meeting, two of whom had 
gone on to attend subsequent national meetings convened under the 
project. One of them told me about the confusion that was stirred up by 
the holding of the meeting: 
They [the participants] accused the facilitators for being involved in settling the 
claim and Z, the uncle of Hosi X … said to the facilitators ‘You people ! Why 
don’t you stop those people from Mashamba to plough? ’ There was a lot of 
tension. … Some of the things people were putting as comments were ‘We don’t 
need this Bill because that land [where Mashamba is] belongs to us ! ’ and ‘Only 
our chiefs are governing us ’ – because with the committee which must be 
nominated, people felt that it was going to take away their powers [of the 
chiefs]. … When they talked about ‘Why now?’, we thought that the government 
were trying to run away from giving us land – how could they facilitate the 
[CLRB] without facilitating our claim? … So the tension was in the whole 
workshop. 
(interview, workshop participant, 20.11.2005) 
Much of this tension had clearly been generated simply by convening a 
meeting that included people from two villages, one of which had an 
unresolved restitution claim over the land of the other. This problem was 
certainly relevant to any tenure reform: any conﬁrmation of people’s 
current rights pursuant to land reform legislation, when it was in fact 
former rights that they were actively seeking to resecure, would not be 
welcome. But the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ approach of progressive land-sector 
activists had somewhat eclipsed these other complexities that were not 
only paramount in the minds of the workshop participants but actually 
threatened to disrupt the whole proceedings. 
Another of the individuals who had attended the Mashamba workshop, 
‘B’, had gone on to participate in subsequent provincial and national 
meetings convened by the project, and had been ﬂown to Cape Town to 
contribute to the submission to be made to parliament. B was a teacher, 
and proudly lent me a copy of his thesis that he had submitted towards 
his degree. It was on the history of the chieftaincy in his village of 
Mashamba – a history that was strongly contested by those villagers in 
Bokisi whose land claim was over much of the territory now making up 
Mashamba. He was softly spoken and thoughtful about the workshops and 
parliamentary process, and told me that he himself had been unhappy 
with the submission that they had made which was so strongly against the 
chiefs. The reason why he had agreed to the submission, however, was 
because he had felt that, in a group, you have to compromise: there had 
been one person in the group (now one of Nkuzi’s members of staﬀ ) who 
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spoke very strongly and cared very deeply about these things. He re­
ﬂected: 
There were a lot of these NGOs in Cape Town, and somehow they were all 
speaking with one voice. And they were very extreme. Maybe it is that where you 
have grown up somehow shapes you. 
EF: Like growing up in Cape Town? 
Yes! And like me, growing up here – maybe it somehow brainwashes you to think 
in some ways 
(personal communication, Mashamba informant, 18.11.2006). 
B’s personal diﬃculties in reconciling the stand he took participating in 
drawing up the submission to parliament are perhaps, here, less important 
than simply recognising the extent to which the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ dis­
course pushed out more nuanced understandings of the chieftaincy in such 
areas. 
Another staﬀ member at Nkuzi, ‘C’, also often found himself engaging 
with politicians, government oﬃcials, land commissioners, activist aca­
demics, traditional leaders and village women’s groups, seemingly equally 
at ease with them all. For him, the problem with CLARA was not the 
chiefs – they could potentially be a problem if they were corrupt and took 
bribes and that of course needed to be dealt with – but deﬁning a com­
munity and territory in the ﬁrst place. He had ample experience of dealing 
with restitution cases in which on-going disputes, sometimes years-long, 
had been rumbling on between ‘communities ’ over deﬁning their terri­
torial boundaries that did not reﬂect the boundaries of property registered 
in the Deeds oﬃce. But adhering to an ‘anti-chieftaincy’ line in this con­
text was just not possible ; such a line failed to grapple with a reality that 
could not be ignored: ‘The TA [Traditional Authority] is there. It has 
been there and is performing a role. You need to be careful about estab­
lishing structures. You currently have [Communal Property Associations] 
where TAs are involved … That’s what I see as a challenge – linkage with 
structures that existed before’ (ibid). 
Such knowledge contrasts with the ‘anti-chieftaincy’, Mamdani­
inspired, discourse that was adopted by Nkuzi to try to further its strategic 
positioning in debates in relation to CLARA. As recognised by Robins 
(2003: 275), ‘ tradition, community and ethnicity, like nationalism, can be 
either emancipatory and progressive, or reactionary and exclusionary’, 
but positioning ‘ tradition’ within such a binary of ‘undemocratic chiefs ’ 
versus the ‘democratic other ’ excludes more nuanced understandings 
of an everyday, negotiated, often contested, reality that is unequal and 
messy in its democratic and undemocratic reach. Moreover, rather than 
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knowledge based on engagements between ﬁeldworkers and constituents 
‘on the ground’ shaping this NGO’s position in those debates, such a 
discourse has instead shaped, or sometimes merely complicated, the 
‘everyday’ relations between some ﬁeldworkers and their constituents. 
: : : 
As recognised above, one key question for NGOs is how to strategise their 
positioning in relation to the wider ﬁeld of power, at the same time as 
representing honestly the voices of their marginalised constituents. In their 
strategic engagements with the policy process relating to CLARA, the 
adoption of a Mamdani-inspired anti-chieftaincy discourse to oppose the 
growing political salience of traditional leaders within national politics was 
understandable. It not only had strong historical resonance with an activist 
land sector, but also ﬁtted with the more sophisticated analyses of certain 
vocal land tenure policy analysts who went on to drive a DfID-funded 
advocacy campaign in opposition to the draft legislation. Moreover, the 
discourse also went some way towards enabling them to present them­
selves as a coalition speaking with one voice against the government. This 
was no mean feat, given that CLARA came to be debated at a time that 
was characterised by immense conﬂict in the activist ﬁeld, with discourses 
of race and gender, liberalism and radicalism drawn upon by actors 
struggling, often unsuccessfully, to position themselves within a changing 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the adoption of the ‘anti-chieftaincy’ discourse 
by NGOs in order to position themselves strategically in relation to 
CLARA at the level of policy also displaced more nuanced knowledge 
of the tenure of people living in ‘ rural areas ’. Moreover, rather than 
knowledge of the messier reality of people living in ‘ rural areas ’ informing 
NGOs’ engagements with policy, engagementswith people ‘on the ground’ 
were simply used to legitimise their positions. The ‘anti-chieftaincy’ dis­
course thus came to shape knowledge that was considered legitimate, and 
this then inﬂuenced the interactions of ﬁeldworkers and their rural con­
stituents. 
This raises the key challenge of the activist ﬁeld: to enable the articu­
lation of diﬀerent ways of thinking by people who share a diﬀerent habitus. 
But there is a paradoxical tension in achieving this. Individuals within the 
activist ﬁeld are relatively powerful in holding suﬃcient capital to partici­
pate in policy debates in South Africa, but enabling the articulation of 
such diﬀerent ways of thinking may also challenge their legitimacy as 
people struggling to represent the ‘oﬃcial version of the social world’. 
Individuals within the activist ﬁeld struggle with others both within and 
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outside the ﬁeld for symbolic capital to make such representations. As 
recognised by Bourdieu, a particular doxa or common sense exists whereby 
the structure, within which the material conditions of life are embedded 
but which is in fact arbitrary, is ‘misrecognised’ as ‘ self-evidently correct ’ 
(Mahar et al. 1990: 16). That is, within any particular ﬁeld not everything 
can happen, in that its structure proposes possible questions which orient 
the activities that occur within the ﬁeld, and renders others unaskable 
(Bourdieu 1990: 5). However, raising questions that are as yet unaskable 
within the activist ﬁeld so as to challenge doxa may also challenge the 
power held by actors operating within and outside the ﬁeld. But even if we 
were to deny this challenge, as recognised by Bourdieu (ibid. :  59),  ‘under­
takings of collective mobilization cannot succeed without a minimum of 
concordance between the habitus of the mobilizing agents …and the dis­
positions of those who recognize themselves in their practices or words ’. 
In the formulation of reforms that are to improve the lives of millions of 
South Africans living in areas to be reformed, enabling such an articu­
lation of an ‘alternative ’ knowledge of tenure that will itself be contested 
may be the only way to shape solutions that are likely to have any pur­
chase in promoting positive change in such areas. 
N O T E S  
1. ‘Rural areas ’ euphemistically describes the former ‘homelands’ (Oomen 2005), even though 
many of these areas have been described more accurately as encompassing a form of ‘displaced 
urbanisation’ (Murray 1992). This ﬁgure, however, includes areas outside the former homelands 
including those living on commercial farms – some 3 million people: in 2002, there were some 
45,818 active commercial farming units (Statistics SA, Agricultural Census) which are likely to overlap 
with numbers of households. However, black labourers and their families also live on such farms: 
according to a survey undertaken by SSNDA 2005, 2.9 million black South Africans lived on such 
farms in 2001. 
2. See e.g. sections of MWPD 1997 relating to tenure reform written by those who had contributed 
to the formulation of the LRB. See also Cousins 2002 and Claassens 2000 for analysis of the LRB in 
relation to their extensive research on South African tenure (in)security. 
3. Bennett (2008: 138) refers to the distinction between ‘oﬃcial ’ customary law: ‘ the body of rules 
created by the state and legal profession’ ; and ‘ living’ law: ‘ law actually observed by the people who 
created it ’. 
4. Following this long political struggle ( James 2007), the NLC eventually closed its national oﬃces 
in April 2005. 
5. My interest in AFRA, one of the few land sector NGOs to have a long-standing tenure project, 
was inspired by an article (Alcock & Hornby 2004) that did not in any way subscribe to the ‘anti-
chieftaincy’ model. 
6. The smart new green road sign pointing to ‘Mashamba Tribal Authority’ belied the more 
politically correct version of ‘Traditional Authorities’ incorporated in the constitution. 
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